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Abstract
This paper will examine current discussions in Turkey centered around the likely decentralization of its educational system as 
part of ongoing reform efforts in public administration. Ironically, both proponents and opponents of the education 
decentralization problematize issues related to resource allocation and discrepancies in educational quality and access under the
current centralized system. Proponents argue that greater autonomy at the local levels will improve educational quality, enhance
stakeholder participation in the administration of the schools, encourage a democratic environment, and create a more responsive
and accountable system. Opponents, on the other hand, worry that the primary problem is in fact the state's approach to public 
education than the actual variations in educational provision. Although it is too early to speculate the model of decentralization
that will be selected, issues such as personnel administration, funding of education, and adherence to principles of unity of 
education and secularism of the existing system remain controversial issues. Further, current concerns pertaining to teacher 
recruitment practices, private spending on education and inadequate state allocation raises questions about the exact motives for
decentralization. Against this backdrop, this paper will examine how a possible decentralization of Turkey’s educational system
will impact issues of quality and equity. It will do so by first examining the current decentralization policies being envisioned in 
Turkey. Following that, it explores selected country cases, which made the transition from a centralized educational structure to a 
decentralized setting and investigates the demonstrated impact of the switch. Subsequently, given the somewhat similarities 
between those studied in the paper and Turkey, this paper concludes that in formulating policies, especially those favoring 
possible decentralization, policymakers must be mindful of the global evidence that is available. Further, given the current 
challenges facing Turkey, decentralization of the educational sector might actually exacerbate the very issues that proponents of
the policy hope would disappear. 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, educational decision-making has undergone an evolution (Stromquist, 2002). Countries around 
the world have introduced numerous educational reforms, some organic while others influenced by external 
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guidance. The commonality, however, is that the majority of the reforms are finance-driven and the recurring theme 
is the need to minimize costs (Stromquist, 2002). Decentralization of education is one such reform, which emerged 
in the 1980s and today has almost become a global phenomenon. The trigger behind the decision to decentralize has 
varied between countries. Essentially, however, the issues that prompted its advent in the last few decades coincided 
with the struggle of socialist states, which led to a decline in confidence about centralized states; the financial 
recessions of the 80s and 90s that plunged several governments into fiscal pandemonium (Fiske, 1996); the 
hesitation of international donor agencies to offer loans to countries without them correcting their fiscal imbalances 
first (Hanson, 1997); and of course the emergence of globalization (Astiz, et al, 2002).  
Broadly, the decision to decentralize a country’s education sector has been endorsed on grounds that it will make 
the system more efficient, effective, and democratic (Gershberg and Winkler, 2004). A decentralized system, 
according to supporters, would annul the vices of public sector service delivery, namely bureaucracy, administrative 
inefficiencies, fiscal wastefulness, and initiate a system that results in greater transparency, accountability and 
responsiveness. However, critics claim that most decentralization decisions are prompted by the intention of 
redistributing financial responsibility (Hanson, 1997), because central governments, too often, find themselves in 
immense fiscal debts. Stated or unstated, this is a primary goal seen often in recent years (for example, in Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the United States) (Hanson, 1997, p. 5).  
2. Emerging Decentralization in Turkey   
After the first wave of the economic–financial liberalization, a second wave of reforms emerged in the late 1990s 
and gradually gained momentum. These reforms targeted the state apparatus (Güler, 2005). Subsequently, with the 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) coming to power in late 2002, it announced a series of reforms in public 
administration and local governments, as part of its party program. The party program (JDP, 2001) stated that the 
Turkish Constitution would recognize the principle of local self-government in accordance with the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government. The state, it mentioned, would be responsible for justice, internal and external 
security, basic education, health, and infrastructure. Further, it was determined that the state would withdraw from 
the productions of all other goods and services and its role should be one of regulation and inspection in remaining 
areas (2002). Eventually, in 2003, the National Program for the Adoption of Acquis stated that reductions in the role 
of the public sector through privatization would become a major priority.
In keeping with the “good governance” agenda adopted by the party , and the envisioned changes in center-local 
relations within the scope of public administration reform, the 58th government program (2002) included 
concomitant reforms for the education sector. As a result, the Ministry of National Education (MONE) would be 
given a coordinating role, while local governments, civil society, and the private sector would be assigned a greater 
role in educational policy making and service provision. Additionally, the Urgent Action Plan (2002), adopted by 
the 58th and 59th governments , envisioned that educational services would be provided at provincial level and local 
branches of MoNE (provincial and sub-provincial directorates) would be handed over to Provincial Special 
Administrations, organizations of central administration at the provincial level. While these bodies would be 
responsible for personnel and resources, curriculum control and supervision would continue to be centralized. 
Against this backdrop, efforts to restructure public administration in Turkey accelerated beginning 2003. As a 
major step in this direction, the draft law on Basic Principles of Public Administration provided the framework for 
the reorganization of the public administration. The first draft mentioned educational decentralization, as a part of 
the Public Administration Reform. However, public pressure forced drafters to eliminate sections that called for 
educational restructuring. Discussions regarding the projected change in organizational structure had primarily 
entailed assigning the Special Province Administrations’ institutional and financal capacities the new responsibility 
of education delivery. Denouncing this move, critics questioned why local branches of MoNE were instead not 
entrusted with more responsibility? Additionally, criticisms were also directed at the lack of a gradual switchover. 
Considering the  provisions of the draft law that paved the way for outsourcing provision of educational services, 
they argued that local bodies would remain incapable of providing education in the midst of cost reductions, which 
would eventually force a privatization regime on educational delivery(Keskin, 2003; Soydan, 2006).  
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2.1. Current Status
In the recent past, Turkey has seen myriad legislations, within the scope of local administration reform including 
Municipalities, Metropolitan Municipalities, Special Provincial Administrations, Unions of Local Authorities, Law 
on Public Financial Management and Control and Law on Share Given to Special Provincial Administration and 
Municipalities from General Budget Tax Revenues being adopted. However, the Draft Law on Basic Principles of 
Public Administration, which restructures the relation between the center and local bodies, is yet to become a law. 
Policymakers have instead chosen to implement certain provisions of the law in an incremental manner. The 
enactment of regulations on decentralization without the complete adoption of the framework law on public 
administration has led to challenges (Keleú, 2009).
Currently, studies have been focused on restructuring efforts at central government and its constituent parts and 
amendment of establishment laws of public institutions. However, according to SIGMA, constitutionality of draft 
law on organizational structures seems problematic (2008). Reports suggest that constitutional reform remains an 
important challenge for further progress in restructuring administration and decentralization/de-concentration of
public services (SIGMA, 2008). In the recent past, the Constitutional Court rejected the provision of new
Municipality law that allowed municipalities to open pre-schools on the grounds that education is considered as a 
state prerogative according to constitution  (dated 24.1.2007 Cardinal numbered 2005/95 and Verdict numbered 
2007/5). Difficulties experienced with the intended regulations in other fields of public administration such as social 
security and state personnel regime because of the conflicts with the constitutional provisions regarding public 
service and public employees (Bagimsiz Sosyal Bilimciler, 2008). In education, legal struggles of teacher unions 
have been going on for a while and numerous lawsuits have been filed against the flexible employment practices of 
the government. In fact, work on constitutional change already started. Government appointed a commission to draft 
constitution but the new draft constitution presented in 2007 was later shelved. Considering the current amendments 
to the Constitution, according to SIGMA, government appeared to proceed with changes in a piecemeal fashion 
(SIGMA, 2008). However debates over new constitution continue to grow in intensity. 
In spite of the existing constitutional and political challenges, reform efforts supported by the European Union 
and World Bank continue to proceed in the direction of decentralization of the Turkish educational system. In fact, 
ongoing European Commission projects and funds have been made available to decentralize vocational education 
and training system and restructure the MoNE. Simultaneously, efforts to improve monitoring and control capacity 
of MoNE have also been strengthened, as part of the decentralization strategy. To address quality problem in 
schools, introduction of competition among public schools and accountability oriented standardized testing are 
among the foreseen changes (World Bank, 2008). Although the scope and extent of projected decentralization is not 
clear yet, it is understood from the ministry officials’ explanations and ongoing project documents that 
deconcentration through shifting responsibility from central government to provincial field units and individual 
schools is increasingly being considered as a decentralization strategy (European Commission, 2006; MoNE, 2009). 
It is, however, also unclear whether additional decisions in favor of decentralization will be pursued in the longer 
run. It is hoped that a clearer picture will emerge after the results from the ongoing EU-sponsored study, titled 
“Capacity Building Support for the MoNE” project and  the promulgation of the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan of MoNE 
expected to address details associated with the envisoned decentralization (ERG, 2009a). 
2.2. World Scenario  
Beginning with the 80s, decentralization in education has gained in momentum around the world. Several 
countries have attempted to decentralize parts of its educational sector at the state, province or local level. In 
general, the trend until now is that developing countries are more likely to decentralize the finance of government 
services than developed nations. In 1979, the Nigerian Constitution ended significant central funding for primary 
education and made it a local responsibility. That was reversed in the 80s and 90s, when the military tried to re-
centralize the system, which actually increased an already heavy fiscal deficit triggered by falling oil prices. Thus, in 
1988, the central government created the National Primary Education Commission, which established the sharing of 
financial responsibility between the center, state and local governments. By 1991, however, the local governments 
had once again been entrusted with the entire responsibility of primary education (Gershberg and Winkler, 2004). 
Argentina decentralized her primary and secondary education to the provincial governments at a time when the 
country was undergoing extreme financial crisis. The center transferred educational financial responsibility to the 
provinces because the country was dealing with a huge financial deficit (Sissoko, 2005). First, the total financial 
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responsibility for primary education was shifted to the provinces in 1978, and followed that up with a co-financing 
strategy for secondary education in the 90s. In quite the same way, Colombia instituted a financial decentralization 
policy in which the center continued to transfer funds to the regions and municipalities, but the regions and 
municipalities themselves would fund any form of expansion. 
Brazil introduced a form of decentralization where officials comprising teachers, parents, and students above the 
age of 16 were appointed to set up a school board, which was entrusted greater financial, administrative, and 
pedagogical autonomy. While the school received a grant based on enrollment, the boards had the liberty to decide 
spending and generate further revenues locally.  
In 1980, the military government in Chile initiated dramatic reforms in the educational sector, which led to a 
simultaneous process of municipalization and privatization. While through the former, decisions regarding school 
expenditure were decentralized to the municipal level, the latter introduced a voucher system, which allowed both 
private and public schools to compete for the same student base. As a result, school revenues were determined on a 
“month-to-month basis by total enrollments and a government-determined voucher. Teachers lost their status as civil 
servants, reverting to municipal contracts, and school buildings and land were signed over to municipal control” 
(Carnoy and McEwan, 2003, p. 3). The vouchers in Chile ushered in a system where public money could be used to 
support private schools.  
Interestingly, the recent past has been witness to the rising phenomenon of privatization in the educational sector. 
The move entails the use of private money to fund public education Examples of this include “parents voluntarily or 
involuntarily paying matriculation fees for admission to public schools; parents paying special fees for their children 
to participate in extracurricular activities, such as band or football; real-estate developers paying a special fee for 
each new house constructed to go for new school construction; the community paying the salaries of teachers for 
government-constructed schools (or vice versa); and proceeds from the school snack shop or parent fund-raising 
activities being used to support the public school” (Hanson, 1997, p.12). 
2.3. Demonstrated Impact  
Perhaps the biggest concern about financial decentralization is its impact on equity. Some analysts believe that 
financial decentralization is justifiable on the grounds that local authorities, once entrusted with the responsibility of 
spending or generating revenues, would take greater care in how the money is spent (Hanson, 1997). However, the 
counter claim to that is, financial decentralization widens already existing inequalities between regions. The 
widening of the gap not only manifests in resource mobilization but also ultimately in the quality of education 
imparted to the students.  As a result, most often what we evidence is an increase in the gap between the rich and 
poor; with some areas having more financial and human resources than others and thereby making the maximum use 
of decentralized power (Fiske, 1996). The abundance in financial resource further translates into better teacher pay, 
better educational inputs, and better per capita student expenditure.  
The evidence from the various decentralization attempts around the world is mixed so far. Fiske, references 
Prawda’s (1993a) research, which found positive outcomes in Mexico and Argentina, where regional differences in 
preschool and primary coverage, repetition and dropout rates, and primary-completion rates narrowed with 
decentralization (1996). Prawda asserts that decentralization also led to better resource management, and authorities 
responded well to local requirements. However, Dr. Adriana Puiggros, a professor of the History of Argentine and 
Latin American Education at the University of Buenos Aires, asserted that decentralization did away with some very 
crucial mainstays of the previously centralized system – namely, state-sponsored programs that had earlier provided 
educational inputs (books, and supplies) were terminated. Teacher salaries also underwent dramatic cuts during this 
phase (Du, 2002). Further, schools that were underfinanced soon faced problems of overcrowding and inadequate 
infrastructure. Stating facts, Puiggros mentioned that due to financial constraints, approximately 46 percent of 
teachers ended up with more than 500 students in their classes, while 18 percent had to cater to more than 1,000 
students in class (Du, 2002).
Perhaps the strongest criticism against financial decentralization is that it increases disparities between rich and 
poor localities. If local governments are free, to supplement central government funding for education with 
additional resources through increased taxes, regions that have low fiscal capacity will not be able to generate 
adequate resources to provide the quantity and quality of education provided earlier (Winkler, 1993). This has 
especially been true in Chile. Carnoy (1998), states that the municipalization and privatization of education in Chile 
led to a decline in total educational spending. Between 1985 and 1990, federal contributions to the educational 
sector declined from 5.3 percent of GNP to 3.7 percent of GNP. While the decline coincided with an increase in 
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municipal and private spending, local financial mobilization was not fast enough to offset the heavy decreases in 
government spending. In effect however, the decline in federal spending resulted in wider disparities between rich 
and poor municipalities. Schools residing in rich municipalities could afford to generate substantial resources 
through private spending, while those on the other side of the spectrum remained limited by the lack of adequate 
resources. In such situations, there needs to be a stronger role for the center in equalizing fiscal capacity, otherwise 
gaps will only widen (Winkler, 1993). 
Critics also argue that an apprehension surrounding financial decentralization is that if local authorities are 
entrusted with the responsibility of managing and spending educational funds, they might be more prone to 
exhausting available resources to meet short-term goals than directing it toward education, where gains are not 
immediate (Fiske, 1996). The problem is especially accentuated during moments of economic crisis, when local 
governments are left with the arduous task of redistributing resources between different sectors.  
2.4. Concerns in Turkey
Traditionally concerns about education decentralization has been emanating from the existence of separatist and 
religious movements in the country considered to be a threat to the  unified education system based on the principle 
of secularism. Although the restructuring process under the globalization and localization forces aggravated these 
concerns, the current discussions are somewhat different from those of the past in terms of  their emphasis on the 
finance of educational provision.
Contemporary critics of educational decentralization in Turkey, view the move as part of a comprehensive public 
administration reform strategy, encompassing organizational, financial and personnel facets, and not simply an
isolated reform move. It must also be remembered, that although the need for reforms in educational administration, 
especially along the lines of personnel regime and local administrations, was widely admitted (ùimsek & YÕldÕrÕm, 
2004), today, debates and tensions have emerged with respect to the nature of the envisioned reforms and what the 
social consequences of such a restructuring process might be. Accordingly, parallel concerns such as the changing 
role of the state as a policy maker, as the provider and purchaser of public services and as an employer; adoption of 
New Public Management techniques (adoption of client-centered and output-oriented perspective) and the role of 
the external actors in the reform processes are expressed in response to both ongoing reform efforts in education and
the other fields of public-service provision (Aydo÷ano÷lu, 2006; Bayramo÷lu, 2004; ÇÕnar, 2005; Güler, 2005; 
Keskin, 2003; Özo÷lu, 2004;Semiz, 2006;Soydan, 2006; Ulu÷, 2004; Yilmaz, 2004; Zengin, 2005). 
Prior to introducing any reform in Turkey, the present condition of education must be remembered. Double 
shifting, over crowded classrooms, multi grade teaching, lack of adeqaute infrastructure, educational equipment and 
material  needs, personnel and auxiliary staff shortages, inadequate support for professional development of 
educational personnel (Egitim Sen, 2009a; MoNE, 2008), significant number of primary school-age children out of 
school, low enrollment rates after primary cycle (ERG, 2009a), inequalities in access to education based on income 
level, regional socio-economic structure and gender (BakÕú, Levent, ønsel & Polat, 2009), existence of socio-
economically stratified public schools (Dinçer& Kolaúin, 2009), excessive expansion of private tutoring (E÷itim 
Sen, 2009a) and psychological and economic burden of exam-centered system on families and students (SPO, 2006; 
World Bank, 2005) are among some of the current problems in Turkish education. Aggravating these problems 
further is the reality of the low shares of GDP that education has attracted for years  2. Additionally, the steady 
decline in investment expenditures (4.57% of the 2009 MoNE budget) and sustained budget shortages have led to
serious concerns about quality and access issues in education (Egitim Sen, 2009a). 
Ironically, both opponents and proponents of the education decentralization  problematize  issues related to 
resource allocation and discrepancies in educational quality and access under the current centralized system (World 
Bank, 2005). Proponents  argue that greater autonomy at the local levels will improve educational quality, enhance 
stakeholder participation in the management of the schools, encourage a democratic environment, and create a more 
responsive and accountable system. Whereas, according to the opponents main problem is with the state's approach 
2Although 47%  of the population is 25 years old or under in the country,  total educational  expenditures  accounted for about  3.1% of GDP  
which is well below both the OECD average of 5.5% and UNESCO benchmark of  6% set for developing countries (ERG, 2009b). Besides,  in 
spite of the envisioned goal of  expanding preschool education and existing infrastructural needs as a result of the recently increased duration of 
secondary education to four years, further decrease in budget allocation for the 2010-2012 triennium has beem  projected (ERG, 2009a). 
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to public education rather than the variations in levels of educational provision. Accordingly, arguments against 
education decentralization in Turkey, claim that it will result in further privatization of public education and deepen 
existing inequalities under centralized system. Underlying these concerns is the belief that the major motive of 
reform is to relieve the central government of its administrative and financial burden. Instead of increasing public 
spending, ongoing and proposed policies in the direction of privatization were suggested to confirm these arguments 
(Keskin, 2003; Soydan, 2006). Noteworthy among these policies and practices are de facto cost-sharing in 
constitutionally free public schools; widespread practice of alternative revenue generation in public schools with 
budget shortfalls; state support for private education through direct public funding of private institutions or incentive 
credits and exemption from corporation and income taxes; various forms of corporate involvement in schools; 
reduction in the cost of labor though flexible employment schemes and salary repression policy; downsizing 
auxiliary staff or outsourcing related services in public schools and efforts to introduce tuition vouchers and public-
private partnerships for school construction (Akça, 2002; E÷itim Sen, 2009b; Gök, 2004; Güler, 2005; Gür, 2006; 
Keskin & Demirci, 2003; Kilincalp, 2007; Soydan, 2006; Türk E÷itim Sen, 2009; Özturk, 2002; Zoralo÷lu et al. 
2005).
3. Conclusion 
Although it is too early to speculate the model of decentralization that will be chosen, recent developments 
indicates that at least further financial decentralization and central control of the curriculum through external 
examinations can be expected. One of the stated intentions of the reform is the introduction  of competition among 
schools. It is not clear for now what kind of mechanisms will be developed to promote competition. However,
considering the envisoned performance-based educational system, it is clear that performance indicators by 
themselves will not create accountability. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect introduction of  mechanisms to 
reward or penalize individual or institutional performance outcomes which can  have implications for personnel 
administration and education funding policies.  
Given the overarching responsibility of instituting fiscal discipline (Boratav, 2009; NPAA, 2008), it would seem 
that increases in government spending in education maybe hard to come by. Quite obviously, the decreases in 
government spending may have to be offset by increases in private contributions3. In fact, the government has 
already stated that saving and efficiency in public spending, as part of  public administration reform would be 
priority (NPAA, 2008). In this sense, considering the broad context of reform; ongoing pressures of international 
finance institutions to depress personnel expenditures and civil service reform agenda expected to bring removal of 
job security for the majority of public employees and flexible employment and the provisions of newly enacted laws 
that paved the way for privatization of public services, examined concerns that emphasize financial motives behind 
decentralization rather than espoused ones seem reasonable.  
Although educational decentralization has been attempted by several countries, the evidence to date is
inconclusive and inconsistent about its impact on quality, fairness or efficiency in educational provision (Fiske, 
1996; Winkler & Yeo, 2007). On the contrary,  finance driven decentralization efforts which has been common in 
the developing countries suggest consistently dissappointing results (Carnoy, 2000). As seen in reforms in 
traditionally centralized systems of Latin American Countries, decentralization in response to fiscal constraints 
commonly introduced with market mechanisms deteriorates the educational provision and quality and exacerbates  
inequality (Arnove & Torres, 2007).
To date, increasing the share of private education at all levels of education and utilizing cost recovery 
mechanisms to overcome  budgetary constraints has long been proposed by several country development plans and 
adopted by successive governments in Turkey (Soydan, 2006). However, it is widely held conviction that 
deterioration in the quality of public school education and privatization is closely associated (BakÕú et al., E÷itim 
Sen, 2009; Gök, 2004). In this sense, failure to pay attention to the trends in other developing countries and the 
domestic concerns about the possible impact of further financial decentralization, which is considered as promoted 
by the sole motive of  contributing  economic stability, may have detrimental and irreversible effects on educational 
system. 
3 The most recent OECD data indicate that central government expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure is 55% , whereas this rate is 39% 
for household expenditures (E÷itim Sen, 2009). On average across OECD countries, the share of spending on education comes from private
sources  is 12% (ERG, 2009a).
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